Grossman, G., Helpman, E. (1995). The policy of free trade agreements. American Economic Review, 85 (4), 667-90. Hicks, R., Kim, S.Y. (2012). Reciprocal trade agreements in Asia: a credible commitment to trade liberalisation or paper tigers? Journal of East Asian Studies, 12 (1), 1-29, Square, C. (2006). review the impact of regional trade agreements on trade flows, with an appropriate specification of the gravity model. European Economic Review, 50 (2), 223-247.
Of the 617 agreements for which we have this information, 459 came into force within one year of signing and another 81 within two years of signing. In addition, some agreements are applied on an interim basis immediately after signing. J. Roy (2010). Do members of the customs union have more bilateral trade relations than members of the free trade agreement? Review of International Economics, 18(4), 663-81. Unlike these lists, we did not count the accession agreements and service agreements that are signed at the same time as agreements on goods as separate ASPs. This explains why our number of agreements notified to the WTO is lower than that indicated by the WTO itself. Busch, M. (2007). Institutions, forum-shopping and dispute resolution in international trade.
International Organization, 61 (4), 735-61. Bethe, T., Milner, H. (2008). The policy of foreign direct investment in developing countries: increased foreign direct investment through international trade agreements? American Journal of Political Science, 52 (4), 741-62. Mansfield, E., Milner, H. (2012). The votes, vetoes and political economy of international trade agreements. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gleditsch, K. (2002). Expanded trade and GDP data. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(5), 712-24.
Baier, S., Bergstrand, J. (2009). Bonus Vetus OLS: a simple method to reconcile international commercial effects with the gravitational equation. Journal of International Economics, 77(1), 77-85. Indeed, in our dataset, comprehensive free trade agreements have an average transitional period of 5.7 years, compared to 1.7 years for partial trade agreements. Customs unions also have a relatively long transition period of 4.5 years. Mansfield, E., Milner, H., Rosendorff, P. (2002). Why democracies cooperate more: electoral control and international trade agreements.
International Organization, 56 (3), 477-514. Preferential trade agreements (EPZs) have grown more and more over the past two decades. A great literature has studied different aspects of this phenomenon. Until recently, however, many Large N studies have paid little attention to variations between PTAs in terms of content and design. Our contribution to this literature is a new set of data on the design of trade agreements, which is the most comprehensive, both in terms of coding variables and covered agreements. We illustrate the usefulness of the dataset to re-check whether and to what extent EDPs influence trade flows. The analysis shows that the PTA increases trade flows on average, but that this effect is largely fuelled by deep agreements. In addition, we provide evidence that regulatory provisions across the border are important for trade flows. However, the contribution of the data set is not limited to the PTA literature. The new data will also benefit from a wider debate on issues such as the organization of institutions and the legalization of international relations.
Eating, M. (2009). Investment in protection: the policy of preferential trade agreements between the North and the South. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baldwin, R., Jaimovich, D. (2012). Are free trade agreements contagious? Journal of International Economics, 88(1), 1-16. Magee, C.S.P. (2008). New measures to create trade and re-focus trade.
Journal of International Economics, 75, 349-362. The new regionalism; The organisation of institutions; Dataset Trade flows Gravity model F140; F150; F5 (Search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2014 References: References in EconPapers See the full reference list of CitEc Cit